One of the fundamental phenomena of Modernity is the erosion of meaning 1 . In recent years, the discussion around the "come back of religion" 2 and the "post-secular society" 3 seems to affirm the problem of a deficit of meaning in (post-)modern society and to invalidate the conviction -firmly held by manythat secularization is inevitable and irreversible 4 and that it is accompanied by an increase in possibilities the individual can freely choose from to construct an existence that is experienced as meaningful and fulfilled 5 . If it would probably be an overinterpretation of the extent of the phenomenon if one was to talk unambiguously about a change of paradigm with regards to secularization, it seems at least possible, at present, to revisit the role transcendence can play for human beings as a constituens of meaning at the beginning of the 21th century and to argue in favor of approaches that allow for perspectives that go beyond mere immanence but without falling short of the state of the art of the knowledge attained in philosophy and the natural sciences over the last 250 years 6 . In the present paper, I will take up this problem of a crisis of meaning and argue that there is an intrinsic link between the possibility to relate existence to a perspective of transcendence and the possibility to "recharge" our being in the world with meaning.
The starting point of my reflections shall be a philosophy that might at first sight seem little appropriate for the endeavor of defending perspectives of transcendence in complete respect of the body of knowledge at the beginning of the early 21 st century but which will, as I hope, reveal itself-at least in some, and in my opinion essential, aspects -as a very useful and instructive approach. The approach in question is the highly polemical defense of faith formulated by Søren Kierkegaard, who posits unambiguously that an existence without anchorage in transcendence is inevitably to be considered as an existence in despair and boredom. Kierkegaard's argument will uncover the problematic structure of the modern attempt of self-creation In a second step, I will illustrate that a crucial aspect of the argumentative structure of the highly intransigent, demanding, and provocative -and certainly in some aspects at least philosophically contestable 7 -Kierkegaardian apology of faith can indeed be identified also in a contemporary "state of the art" approach to transcendence which, even though it explicitly takes 
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Kierkegaard's Seducer's Diary as an attempt to fully poeticize reality (Kierkegaard 1987, 301-445 It is in Either/Or that he abundantly and eloquently illustrates the seductive power and yet existential vacuity of aesthetic existence. His methodological proceeding is very particular as he develops his strongly ambivalent interpretation through a double -and perspectivist -approach. In a sort of literary fiction 11 , he first lets an "aestheticist" express his world view and life style, which, in a reply to this aesthetic way of existing, is criticized and put into perspective by an "ethicist". Through this double perspective, Kierkegaard makes very clear that the aesthetic existence appears to be appealing at first; however, such an existence cannot but inescapably fail and in the end leads inevitably into despair 12 . In this sense, the ethicist explains in the second part of the work that, "nothing finite, not the entire world can satisfy the soul of a man who feels the longing for eternity within him" (Kierkegaard 1987, 758) .
Given that the aesthetic existence anticipates a certain number of fundamental features of the way of life in contemporary western society (or, to put it the other way round, as the modern western way of living could appear to be a trivialized form of the Kierkegaardian aesthetic existence 13 ), it is worth insisting on the fact that Kierkegaard has the aesthetic existence inevitably shipwreck in boredom and despair. His explanation for this inevitable failure of aesthetic existence is related to the problem of a reduction of modern orientation to merely immanent perspectives. In focusing exclusively on immanent possibilities, the human spirit experiences the limitedness inherent to them.
The immanent possibilities from which we can choose lack distinction and appear to be -in the literal sense -equivalent and thus exchangeable and random. According to Kierkegaard, as long as we remain within the realm of immanent possibilities, we lack a valid criterion of discrimination which would allow us to prefer one possibility rather than another 14 . In the framework of Kierkegaardian thought this is inevitable insofar as human (2006) , Schwab (2012) .
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The insightful study Die Erlebnisgesellschaft by the German sociologist Gerhard Schulze illustrates that modern society is more and more oriented towards what is interesting, stimulating, etc. and what helps us to make a kind of "special event" ("Erlebnisprojekt") out of our lives (Schulze [1992] , 13). Reason, in fact, is not able to prove, nor to refute, the existence of God, transcendence is placed beyond the possibility of rational accessibility. In a certain way, to abandon the attempt to provide ultimate justifications is a major argumentative advantage, but his claim is at the same time an inconvenience: in fact his intention is to ultimately promote a perspective on the world that is embedded in transcendence; and I will argue that it is precisely in this more implicit but finally central intention that we find common ground between the two approaches, where the existential relevance of both concepts unfolds.
In a study published in 2005, concisely and unambiguously in its focus called God, Rentsch first emphasizes that his primary aim is what he calls a "Standortbestimmung" of philosophy as a discipline, that is, to determine the "self-understanding of philosophy today" (Rentsch 2005, VIII 15 In articulating statements on God, we indicate that these statements have this eminent status, that they are precisely not to be understood as empirical statements on facts.
(ibid. 12) 17
To legitimate the talking about God as a discourse on something that is not to be confused with the naming of facts within the empirical world, Rentsch claims that there is nothing extraordinary in talking about something which is not in this sense to be considered as 'facts'. In fact, as he states, we do that every day insofar as not only God, but reality as such cannot be reduced to a simple statement of facts on objects. Reality is not an agglomerate of 'objects' but reality, as our reality, is already a non-empirical phenomenon. With a certain proximity to
Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world, he notes: (2) the transcendence of the Self; and
(3) the transcendence of language.
According to Rentsch, these three phenomena of transcendence are nothing less than the "principal conditions of the possibility and reality of our human world" (ibid., 67) 20 . He represented by these phenomena, "immanence is not even possible, real, or simply conceivable" (ibid., 78) 21 .
One of the main aspects in his claim that these phenomena of transcendence not only are not irrational but even depend on reason is to stress the limitedness of the concept of reason forwarded by scientific-functionalist ways of thinking. His critique of the reductionist scientific conceptualization of reason allows Rentsch to refute the argument according to which the discourse on phenomena of transcendence is per se irrational.
It is important to emphasize, says Rentsch, that transcendence, as a phenomenon, is "knowable, rational, and universal", criticizing all variations of "reductionist objectivistic-scientistic world views which cut off reason and transcendence" (ibid., 108). This is why authentic processes of conversion are this profound and earthquake-like: When we enter into a relationship with ourselves that is based upon God, absolute meaning, and the miracle of creation, the whole understanding that we had until then of the world and of ourselves is transformed. In a certain sense, nothing remains as it was before." (ibid., 113) 24
There is a striking parallel in this description of religious awakening and the passage from Kierkegaard's Either/ Or we examined earlier, where the ethicist talks about the "metamorphosis" the things in the world undergo as a result of this opening up to transcendence; and it is certainly not by accident that there is another element in Rentsch's analysis which seems to respond to the Kierkegaardian concept of the instant as the category par excellence of our relatedness to the eternal.
Rentsch proposes a conceptualization that is quite similar to Kierkegaard's. In this sense, Rentsch notes:
We get partially beyond an understanding based upon finitude and transience and become open to potentials of meaning of transcendence and adopt thus the perspective of a meaning that cannot be eradicated by the transience of time: Eternity, not understood as infinite temporality and iteration, but as an irruption of transcendence into immanence 
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Aus diesem Grund sind auch Here, both approaches have to be discussed separately in that their answers diverge in terms of their methodology, though they finally converge, in a certain sense, in their essence. It might seem that Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" is more difficult to defend as a claim in the early 21 st century. This is certainly true in the sense that Kierkegaard, in as it is incarnated by the advances of knowledge in the natural sciences. The question of faith and the question of God are not in contradiction with science, but it would be better to say that science cannot even ask these questions in a meaningful way because it would otherwise transgress its own boundaries and domains of competence. For Rentsch, transcendence represents a phenomenon that appears at the limits of reason and remains thus negatively accessible 31 .
However, if Rentsch seems to make the claim that the famous "leap" is unnecessary, one might object that in his approach there is no immediate nor necessary transition from the proof that there are phenomena of transcendence and that these are accessible for human reason to what is commonly called "faith" in the same sense as it is certainly possible but not necessary either to use the name of "God" for the phenomena identified by Rentsch. So I would argue that what causes this transition from the knowledge about phenomena of absolute transcendence to faith, inevitably remains inaccessible for human reason 32 . This would imply then that, in one sense, Kierkegaard was right to claim the there still is the necessity for a "leap", for something inexplicable and beyond reason and reasoning that allows us to take the step from the reasonably accessible to what faith means in its most eminent sense. 
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